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I.

Introduction

China’s current land system is a legacy from the era of the Central Planning System,
when all the factor markets were eliminated as evils, and all the factors of production
were nationalized or collectivized.

In the absence of factor markets and private

ownership, all the factors had to be allocated administratively. However, the belief that a
government can use a Central Planning System to better allocate resources in a fairer and
more efficient way than a market mechanism has been proven totally groundless by the
glaring failures in all the nations that once experimented with this idea.
1.1 The fatal problem of Central Planning System
Ironically, compared with other economic allocation mechanisms, a Central Planning
System, by its very nature, needs much more information for its alleged capability—to
design a grand socio-economic plan to coordinate all the economic sectors in order to
eliminate once and for all any forms of shortage and surplus. Obviously, as a
precondition for such a mission, a Central Planning System must have not only
comprehensive, but also constantly updated information before it can respond to the
changes in demand and supply that often set the economy off equilibrium. Here exactly
lies the fatal flaw of Central Planning System: it can never generate such information,
because its very existence is built on the elimination of all the factor markets, the only
1

source of dynamically evolving and constantly updating equilibrium factor prices. With
these prices gone, all the information that is crucial to the success ofCentral Planning
System is lost too. These prices are irreplaceable, and formed only through the interaction
of suppliers and demanders in the free and competitive market. They are self-correcting
and self-updating automatically in response to all kinds of shocks, be it social,
institutional, cultural, demographical, economic, political, or climatic. The price
fluctuations represent markets’ effort to quantify the otherwise unquantifiable impacts of
these shocks. Without such fluctuations, there is no way a market can reach a new
equilibrium that equates supply and demand under constantly evolving circumstances.
Hence, by eliminating free and competitive factor markets, the only mechanism that can
generate such information, the Central Planning System eliminates what it needs most—
all the sources of information themselves. In the absence of adjustable equilibrium
prices, how can a Central Planning System know how to design a grand plan that can
equate supply and demand? Without equilibrium prices, how can a firm know if its
production is earning profit or actually suffering from losses, and if it is properly
rewarding its hard-working workers and innovative technicians? Also, in the absence of
such information, how can a Central Planning System know how to discipline those who
are either lazy with their jobs or slow in innovation?
By eliminating the market mechanism, all the governments that adopted the Central
Planning System had to turn to political favoritism, cronyism, or nepotism to motivate
workers, technicians and managers, or simply intimidate them by coercion, resulting in
rampant waste, chronic shortage, technological stagnation, and deep resentment. The socalled grand plans that all the Central Planning Systems were once so proud of all
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degenerated into top-leaders’ whims, speculations, empty promises, arbitrary commands,
and compulsion that were out of touch with the real needs of people.
In China’s case, such a planning system brought China’s economy to the brink of collapse
in the early 1960s at the end of the Great Leap Forward Movement, and again in the late
1970s at the end of the Cultural Revolution. The fatal problem of the Central Planning
System became clear: in the absence of free and competitive factor markets, Central
Planning is nothing but a fantasy.
1.2 Reintroduction of market mechanism and the remaining problems
Fortunately by gradually moving away from the Central Planning System since the early
1980s, China has been nurturing the market mechanism and using price signals
increasingly to coordinate production and to equate supply and demand. The result is
spectacular. The chronic shortage and surplus of most products widely observed under the
Central Planning System have mostly disappeared after using price mechanisms to
coordinate production.
While China has made significant progress in using markets to coordinate its products, its
factor markets, i.e., its land market, labor market, and capital market, have met strong
resistance due to the various institutional barriers (World Bank, 2012). Its labor market is
stratified in favor of urban population as a result of the Hukou system. Its capital market
has been heavily intervened by the government through interest control and credit
rationing in favor of SOEs. However, it is its land market has been experiencing most
severe problems—it is completely monopolized by the state through administrative
channel. Compared with other factor markets, land market has never got a real
opportunity to develop.
3

1.3 Structure of the paper
In what follows, Section II discusses the initial benefits generated from the current land
institutions; Section III discusses the consequences of the distortions in the absence of
land market; Section IV discusses possible solution; Section V concludes the paper.
II.

Initial Benefits Generated from the Current Land Institutions

2.1 Evolution of China’s land tenure system
According to Article 10 of China’s Constitution adopted in 1982, all the non-farmland,
including all the urban land, is owned by the state, and most farmland,1 including rural
residential sites, is owned collectively but prohibited for sale.2 The same article also
stipulates that the government is allowed to take land from rural collectives to pursue
public interest. The two stipulations of the same article are self-contradictory. The
second one limits government land taking to circumstances where the government can
prove its land taking is for public interest. However, the first one allows a city
government to nationalize all the surrounding rural land where it expands. It is based on
this interpretation that the local governments have been busy converting into urban land
all the farmland within its fast expanding urban boundaries, be it for public interest or for
commercial use.

1

A small amount of farmland is owned by the state and farmed by the state-run farms, most of
them are located in China’s remote border areas.
2

See Article 10 of the 1982 Constitution. It reads as follows, “Land in the cities is owned by the state. Land in the
rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those portions which belong to the state in accordance
with the law; house sites and private plots of cropland and hilly land are also owned by collectives. The state may
in the public interest take over land for its use in accordance with the law. No organization or individual may
appropriate, buy, sell or lease land, or unlawfully transfer land in other ways. All organizations and individuals who
use land must make rational use of the land.” See http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html
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Since 1982, despite numerous regulations and policies have been issued to regulate the
land use in response to accelerating urbanization, the above self-conflicting constitutional
stipulations remain unchanged. The ownership of farmland can neither be traded among
peasants, nor among rural collectives or between rural and urban sectors without being
initiated first by the government. At all localities the government views farmland
requisitioning as one of the main sources of local finance and makes no distinctions
between public and commercial interest when land taking from rural collectives occurs.
Therefore, the constitutional stipulation that land taking should be in public interest has
been totally ignored by the government.
In 1984, the No. 1 Document of the CPC finally endorsed the secret experiments
undertaken in some remote and poor areas since 1978 by officially returning exit rights
from the communal production to peasants. Once given by this option, the vast majority
of the peasants chose to leave the compulsory collective production. They regained the
exclusive land use rights and restored the long tradition of organizing production on
individual household basis. Thus, the commune system was basically dismantled except
for a few localities by 1984 out of peasants’ own choice, and replaced by the Household
Responsibility System (HRS). Under the new system, village land is still collectively
owned, but peasants obtain the use rights to his or her share in village land proportionate
to the population share. The peasants still do not have exit rights from the collective land
ownership, but by the exclusive use rights to their land and their residential sites, they
become residual claimants of their production.
As the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) became a main force of industrial
production after the middle 1980s, rural collectives were allowed to designate a certain
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amount of farmland for non-farming activities. These plots are called collective
construction sites and used by rural collectives to pursue industrial or commercial interest.
Most of them become idled after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 that resulted in sharp
decline in TVEs except for coastal and suburban areas. The geographical proximity to
transportation hubs makes these areas the favorite destinations for FDIs seeking cheap
land and labor.
2.2 The dividends derived from the current land tenure system
The capability of China’s agricultural sector to provide enough food to feed the
population had been one of the top concerns of Chinese leaders since the early 1960s
when China experienced a severe famine, followed by chronic nationwide food shortage
throughout the 1960s to the early 1980s. The low productivity and limited food output
relative to China’s growing population under the commune system made it a must to
impose ruthless restrictions on the pace of industrialization and urbanization. Now under
the HRS, the rampant food shortage has been replaced by abundant food supply. China is
in a position for the first time in its modern history to be able to focus wholeheartedly on
industrialization and urbanization. China’s rural areas not only provide an increasing
amount of output, but also provide an increasing number of surplus laborers to nonfarming sector. Currently, around 260 million migrant workers are working in urban
areas and most of them are from rural areas. These workers constitute the backbone of
China’s powerful export-oriented manufacturing sector and explain to a great extent why
China can turn itself from a basically autarkic economy with a trivial share in the world
total trade into the second largest economy, the largest trading nation, as well as the
largest holder of foreign reserves in the world in about 30 years.
6

In addition to output and labor, the current land tenure system also provides cheap and
abundant supply of industrial land in two ways. First, it is easy for the government at
various localities to requisition farmland from rural collectives, because rural collectives
are not allowed to sell their land to anyone else but to the government. With this
monopsony position, the government does not have to pay high compensation to local
peasants. Second, as mentioned above, rural collectives are also allowed to designate a
certain amount of their own land for industrial and commercial activities at very low
rentals and very loose environmental codes and enforcement.
The government then allocates only a small part of it for residential use, leaving most for
industrial use. While the firms, especially those of FDIs can get cheap land thanks to this
policy, the small supply of residential land means that there will be excess demand for
residential sites. The developers have to bid for the limited supply of residential land at
the government controlled land auction market. The government thus can reap most of
the steep appreciation of the land through fierce bidding war among developers. The huge
amount of land wealth collected by the government from this channel then can be used to
finance the investment in local infrastructures and other urban renovations. Here lies the
secret why China can change the skylines of its urban areas so rapidly. In the last 20
years since the early 1990s, China has renovated most of its cities. It is the largest
government-initiated and government-led urbanization ever taking place in human
history.
III.

Negative Consequences of the Current Land Tenure System
3.1 The tasks that the current land tenure system has failed to deal with
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However, serious problems have been accumulated under the current land tenure system.
As pointed out, the main features of the current land tenure system was determined in
1982 when a new Constitution was adopted in the wake of the Cultural Revolution and
when China was focusing on reforms in rural areas where the commune system was not
yet replaced by the HRS. Therefore, the land tenure system stipulated by the Constitution
did not take into its consideration the following formidable tasks that soon arose
inevitably. The followings are some of the tasks.
1) To gradually transfer all the farmland, all the rural residential sites with the housings above,
and all the collective construction sites to those who choose to remain to be farmers as
urbanization deepens;
2) To convert the suburban farmland into urban land efficiently and peacefully:
3) To absorb gradually most of the rural population through urbanization;
4) To maintain the stable production of agriculture during this period;
5) To prevent the urban/rural income disparity from worsening;
6) To make sure that the remaining farmers are those who are not only most efficient but also
those who choose to do so with their own will.
These tasks involve at least 1.8 billion mu of farmland, at least 500 million rural residents,3
hundreds of thousand villages, and thousands of towns and cities. No one has the full
information how to coordinate the transfer of land and people in rural areas and between rural
and urban areas, especially in a peaceful, efficient, and voluntary manner. However, given the
restrictions of the current land tenure system, all these transfers will not happen. The government

3

At the current official urbanization level of 52%, there are still 6.5 hundred million rural residents. Suppose China
can retain one hundred million farming population, given that China has 1.8 billion mu of farmland, each of them
will only have 18 mu, or little more than 3 acres of farmland. The rest of the farming population has to leave the
farming sector to make a living.
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has to intervene directly. This means that all the land and population in rural areas have to be
allocated administratively in a way that is exactly what we saw under a Central Planning System.
Such an allocation method is doomed to fail sooner and later after some glorious moments.
If there are land markets plus free migration policy across the nation, they will take care of the
allocation of the land and houses on the daily basis through voluntary and peaceful process at
mutually acceptable prices that emerge at the land markets and labor markets. 4 But under the
current land tenure system, no such transactions can happen beyond the boundaries of a village
without the initiation of the local government. All the transfers of rural land and houses are
illegal if one party of the transaction is from outside of a village.
3.2. No solutions in the absence of a land market.
In the absence of a real land market, there are no solutions to the following thorny problems.
1). It is impossible for more efficient farmers to emerge and to become owners of modern farms
by taking over the land of less efficient farmers. Actually the most capable peasants, being
unable to expand their land operation scale in an institutionally secured way through fair
competition and land acquisition, choose to leave rural areas. This is why China’s farming sector
is now run increasingly by the aged, weak, sick, female, and handicapped. As a result,
modernization of agriculture remains to be a remote dream to China.
2). It is impossible to fairly compensate those farmers whose land is taken by the government
because there is no objective reference of market equilibrium price.
3). It is impossible to use land efficiently among farmers because tenants, even most efficient
ones, have no secured tenancy rights. The land they rent in can be taken back often by those who
return from cities for various reasons.

4

As mentioned above, due to the Hukou system, the labor market is also not working properly. But this topic
deserves a separate paper and will not be fully discussed here.
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4). It is impossible to find out the true opportunity cost of a plot of land that is to be converted to
urban land. In the absence of land market, therefore, land allocation cannot be efficient.
5). It is impossible for a city to grow endogenously5 and to determine its natural physical
boundary. Without allowing try and error at the land market to exhaust the agglomeration effects,
the land price and housings price are doomed to be seriously distorted and the expansion of the
city cannot be determined by the drive to exhaust the agglomeration effects, but by the drive to
reap the monopoly rent on land. Therefore, the urbanization is pushed exogenously by the
government and the urbanization of land is much faster than the urbanization of rural population.
5). Impossible to know the true value of a piece of land or a property because of the seriously
inflated land price. Therefore, there is no solid ground to calculate property taxes and other land
related taxes. Since all the land is either owned by the state or collectives, there is no legal basis
to impose property taxes that otherwise can replace the current unfair and wasteful land
financing through land selling.
6). Impossible to prevent land and housing bubbles from bursting. Because of the monopsony in
getting rural land from farmers and monopoly of the urban land by the government, one of the
two root causes6 of the housing bubble, as long as the numerous government regulations issued
in recent years do not touch this root cause, they are doomed to fail in controlling housing price
as the government intends.
7). It is impossible to reduce the rural-urban income disparity, given urbanization becomes so
exclusive as a result of the hukou system and particularly the prohibitively high housing price
relative to the meager income of migrant workers from rural areas.
5

By endogenous, I mean that the expansion of a city is mainly driven by agglomeration effects, not by distorted
factor prices or government expenditures and subsidies. Firms and population are attracted to flow to the city
because they can reduce their average production cost or enhanced their household income and welfare.
6
Another one is the oversupply of money, that, in turn, is caused by greatly inflated foreign reserves under a
managed exchange rate regime.
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8). It is impossible for the rural finance to emerge and grow normally because the ownership and
property rights of rural land are not well defined, thus, cannot be used as collaterals.
9). It is impossible for more efficient cooperatives to emerge to replace the less efficient ones
because peasants are forced to stay in their current collectives, no matter how inefficient and
corrupt these collectives are, or simply lose they land share if they choose to quit from the
current ones.
10). It is hard to booster domestic consumption because people’s purchasing power is seriously
eroded by the prohibitively high housing price in urban areas.
11). It is impossible to stop local governments from land taking for non-public interest projects.
They are so busy with such activities that they can hardly focus on its own designated job—
providing public service.
12). It is impossible to provide the most important opportunity of social mobility to rural
population—to absorb and integrate them into urban communities to benefit from the
agglomeration effects.
13). It is impossible to obtain useful information about how, where, and for whom, and how
many low rental apartments should be built even if the government has the money, land and will
to do so. Lack of information has already led government-sponsored low-rental housing projects
to be located in areas where few would like to live despite the overall strong demand for such
housing. It is impossible to overcome the coexistence of ghost towns and overcrowded urban
villages. Consequently, the urban-rural divide will continue,
14). It is impossible to effectively reduce the friction or confrontation between the government
and the famers as long as land taking is still conducted in the current way that basically ignores
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farmers’ rights to their own land and ignores the fairness of compensation for land loss in the
absence of a true land market.
15). It is impossible to legalize the emerging underground land markets and housing markets and
to eliminate the potential clashes between the formal and informal land markets and housing
markets. Despite the fact that urban villages that are growing and thriving across all the urban
areas, and the fact that they become de facto the main source, often the only source, of low-rental
housing to migrant workers and low-income urban residents, the residents there continue to face
the uncertain legal status of their housing, because their housings are illegal and can be
demolished any time by the government according to the current land tenure system.
16). It is impossible for China to claim to be a nation of law that respects and protects people’s
properties. Most land takings violate China’s own constitutional stipulation that no land taking
should take place unless it is done in the name of public interest.
IV. The Way Out
4.1 The current land tenure system is killing any hope for a true land market.
Compared with labor market and capital market, the least developed is the land market.
The labor market and capital market, imperfect as they are, at least play an important role
in allocating labor and capital respectively. In sharp contrast, one could hardly say that
China has a land market in its true meaning. As is discussed above, land is de facto
allocated exclusively through direct administrative efforts. According to the current land
tenure system, no individual farmers are allowed to own land. All the farmland is owned
by rural collectives, but the latter have no rights to buy and sell land to other rural
collectives, let alone to anyone from non-farming sector. They are only allowed or forced
to sell to the government for the purpose of urban and industrial development. Under this
12

stipulation, the government is the de facto monopsony at the primary land markets
because only the government has the right to purchase farmland and to convert it for
urban use. The government is also the monopoly at the secondary land markets that
auction leaseholds to developers. Hence, the government is the only legal demander for
farmland. It is also the only legal supplier of urban land. All the other potential suppliers
of land for urban expansion, mostly individual farmers and their collectives, are illegal
under this land tenure system, and facing crack-downs frequently.
By design, the current land tenure system totally insulates the supply of urban land (in
this case the rural collectives) from its demanders (in this case the migrant workers and
the urban families and firms), leaving the government as the only intermediary between
the supply and demand. The spontaneous interaction between supply and demand through
price signals is impossible.
In this sense, the significance of the decision made by the third plenary of the 18th
congress of CPC cannot be overemphasized. This important decision defines the direction
of future reform in the following language: “[t]he basic economic system should evolve
on the decisive role of the market in resource allocation.”7 This is the first time that CPC
makes it so clear that all the resources should be allocated decisively by market instead of
the government. CPC urges that the economic institutions should be evolved in this
direction. By saying this, China implicitly admits that up to now its factor markets have
not fully developed. Remember this is the main argument of most of the developed
nations based on which they refuse to give market status to China despite the latter has

7

http://www.chinausfocus.com/china-news/the-decision-on-major-issues-concerning-comprehensivelydeepening-reforms-in-brief/
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been urged them strongly to do so. This very honest assessment of the status of China’s
factor markets represents a huge step for China to address this issue.
4.2 Face the reality—no escape from land market
The essence of using markets to allocate resources lies in the fact that all the resources
have to be allowed to enter markets freely and to be traded without institutional
discrimination before equilibrium prices can be generated and supply and demand can be
equated. The equilibrium prices are the indications of the opportunity costs of those that
are being transacted. Only when we know the opportunity cost of each thing, we can
know how to allocate it efficiently and rationally. Without knowing its opportunity cost,
how could one know if it should be treasured or trashed?
Equilibrium prices can only generated through repeated trade. If a priori something is
excluded from being traded at market, then there is no way to reveal its real value. Only
through the interaction of supply and demand, a mutually acceptable price will emerge to
reflect its true value. In this sense, it is hopeless for a true land market to emerge under
the current land tenure system.
In the absence of a true land market, both the old and newly acquired urban land is
allocated through direct administrative method, causing all the efficiency problems and
social justice problems. The same phenomena observed under the Central Planning
System now can be seen everywhere: i.e., the coexistence of chronic surplus and chronic
shortage. We see rampant short supply of residential land, ordinary residential housings,
especially the low rental housings and cheap apartments. At the same time we see chronic
surplus of industrial parks, idling collectively owned construction sites, and unoccupied
14

luxury apartment buildings, empty supermarkets, and deserted stores in numerous ghost
towns mushrooming across the nation.
China is in a dead end in the evolution of its land tenure system. This system prevents a
real land market from emerging. Without government direct intervention, land demand
cannot interact with land supply. In the absence of a true land market, land prices and
housing prices are inevitably distorted. When there is no reliable price reference for land
allocation, efficient and fair allocation of land is beyond China’s reach.
The lasting distortion in land supply and land prices cannot be corrected automatically,
threatening to derail China’s urbanization at a time when China not only urgently needs
to integrate more than 200 million migrant workers, but also needs to urbanize most of its
rural population.
As the housing bubble is looming bigger and bigger, the Central Government feels more
and more pressure to intervene administratively the land supply and housing demand by
issuing an increasing number of often inconsistent rules and regulations with little effect.
If such situation continues, China will rely more and more on administrative allocation of
land, drifting further away from its original goal of nurturing a truly competitive
nationwide land market.
4.3 Historical lessons
Here some review of history ire very relevant. During the peak of the commune
movement from 1958 to 1961, there was a tendency to share properties, grain output,
income, and land ownership without compensation across different production teams, or
even across different production brigades within a commune. In most provinces, peasants
were even forced to join the communal dining halls under which peasants even lost the
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control over their own grain rationings, let alone their own products. This extreme
egalitarianism deprived peasants of any incentive to work hard, resulting first in free ride
problem and rampant food waste while food was still available in the fall of 1958, then in
sharply declined production and sharply rise in death toll in 1959 and 1961. The
deteriorating situation eventually led the government to permit peasants to decide on their
own whether they wanted to leave the communal dining halls or not in May, 1961. Of
course, farmers chose to exit from the compulsory dining halls immediately, and the
famine ended abruptly in the same year, despite that fact that the per capita grain
consumption in rural areas reached the lowest since 1958. It was indeed a miracle that
China could overcome the great famine when the per capita grain consumption fell to its
lowest level since 1949. The main reason that China succeeded in ending the famine
should be attributed mainly the rights that the Chinese peasants regained to exit the
compulsory, wasteful, and inefficient communal dining halls. What should be pointed out
emphatically is, the promise to allow the peasants to exit was not empty. The peasants
were allowed to line up in front of the communal warehouses to claim back their food
rationings, no matter how meager they were. The free sharing of food among different
households and villages was effectively stopped and the rampant free ride problem was
mitigated to a great extent. By giving peasants the free exit right from the communal
dining halls also avoided an unnecessary debate over whether the communal dining was
more socialist over the private kitchens in a time when the communal dining halls had
been equated to communism in the previous years and many were already penalized
politically for being opposed to this radical institution.
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Lessons also can be learned from how the commune system was formally abolished
nationwide in 1984. The peasants started to exit secretly from the compulsory collective
production since late 1970s in some remote and poor rural areas by returning to
household-based production. As this practice spread to more and more places because the
peasants were allowed to keep more of the above quota products as a result of its much
higher efficiency, eventually the CPC and the Chinese government endorsed this rural
reform in 1984. By giving peasants the exit rights from the compulsory collective
production, the commune system was deserted in most places automatically except for
Nanjie Village in Henan province and Huaxi Village in Jiangsu province. The exit right
this time is also not empty promise. The formerly collectively used land was divided up
among peasants on the per capita basis. The peasants are allowed to have the exclusive
use rights to their land and to organize their production on the family basis or group basis.
In retrospect, one can see that by emphasizing exit rights, one can avoid the controversy
of whether the commune system was socialist or not, and emphasize instead that even if it
is a good system, it still should be formed by peasants’ own free choice. One thus can
avoid the sensitive question of whether allowing the privatization of land use rights
represented an effort to go back from socialism to capitalism. At the time Deng
Xiaoping’s advice to reformists was, do not get into ideological debate. This is wise
because many of the defenders of the commune system could use the prevailing orthodox
ideology to their advantage. By giving the exit right back to peasants, a move backed by
CPC’s own principle of voluntarism, the key point in the debate now is no longer about
whether socialism is better than capitalism, but whether one should force peasants to do
what they dislike. If the commune system were really efficient and beneficial to the
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peasants, why the majority of the peasants would not have chosen to retain it? By
emphasizing exit rights, one also can avoid forcing some peasants to abandon their
collectives, such as the above-mentioned Huaxi Village in Jiangsu province and the
Nanjie Village in Henan province. Giving exit rights to the peasants means that the
government should respect peasants’ own choice. It is alright if the local peasants decide
to retain the commune system. Thus the Chinese government skillfully avoided a
potentially treacherous ideological debate in the wake of the Cultural Revolution when
the leftist radicalism was still rampant.
The result of allowing peasants to exit from the commune system is spectacular both in
term of TFP growth and in total output (Wen 1993). In less than 10 years since this
institutional innovation, China was able to abolish its long dependence on food coupons
to ration food among urban residents. Despite the fact that China’s population has almost
doubled since the late 1960s and its fast growing per capita income has led to more meatbased dietary, and China’s farming is mainly undertaken by those who are mostly aged,
weak, sick, female, and handicapped on a shrinking acreage of arable land due to
urbanization and industrialization, food supply is abundant everywhere in China. Based
on the brief review above, we can see exit rights play a crucial role in improving
production efficiency, rural income, and nation-wide food security and provide a solid
foundation to industrialization and urbanization.
4.4 Endogenous urbanization must be guided by factor markets
The outdated land system is one of the two most important root causes of why China’s
urbanization is government-driven instead of market-driven, and why it is exclusive to
rural population. Another root cause is China’s hukou system. In this sense, China’s
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urbanization is not endogenous and sustainable because it is not based on the net gains of
agglomeration effects, but based on the government expenditures financed by the
underpaid land requisitions and overcharged leasehold auction. Under this model, urban
sprawling, driven by seeking land transfer fees and GDP growth, becomes a serious
problem. If the trend of exclusive urbanization continues, the already extremely high
rural-urban income disparity can hardly be reduced.
An endogenous urbanization should be driven by net gains from agglomeration effect. As
long as the agglomeration effects have not been exhausted, firms and individuals have
incentive to move in to reap such potential net gains. However, in order to achieve
endogenous urbanization, the net gains of agglomeration effects must be based on
undistorted prices of all factors. The interest rate at the capital market, wage rate at the
labor market, and land rental at the land market should all be determined through free and
open competition. When factor markets are free, open, and competitive, possible
deviation of factor prices from their long-term equilibrium level can be more easily
corrected to prevent lingering and continuously inflating bubbles.
It becomes obvious that not only the current land system has many serious shortcomings,
but also represents a dead end that prevents self-evolution in a market compatible way.
This is because it neither allows the peasants to exit from the compulsory collective land
ownership, nor allows peasants to enter collectively into non-farming sectors using their
land as assets. Under this land tenure system it is illegal even for the peasants to supply
land collectively to urban sector on their own terms and provide housing to urban people
at the market price. There is no any room for a real land market from emerging and
growing. The urban areas can expanding only when the government allows, because
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only the government can take farmland from peasants, and only the government can own
and supply urban land. If a real land market cannot emerge, then the so-called land price
and housing price cannot be the prices determined by the land supply and land demand.
In order to let a true land market to emerge, the only way is to abolish it.

V. Conclusion
In summary, we can see that giving exit rights from the communal dining halls ended
immediately the famine that China was still suffering in 1961 when its rural population’s
per capita grain consumption fell to the lowest point since 1949. The exit right also
boosted the production since then. However, this exit right was limited to the communal
dining halls, not the communal production itself. With this limited exit right, the famine
ended, but the nationwide rampant food shortage lasted for more than 20 years until when
peasants regained the right to exit from the collective production in the early 1980s.
Once the exit rights from the compulsory collective production are given to peasants,
both the agricultural production and productivity increased dramatically. However, the
peasants are not allowed to exit from the compulsory collective land ownership. This
incompleteness in the exit rights leads to all kinds of serious issues such as rural-urban
income disparity, land disputes among peasants, frequent clashes and confrontations
between peasants and the local governments, underground land and housing markets
(housing with incomplete property rights or Xiao Chanquan Fang), greatly inflated land
and housing price in urban areas, and the low capacity of urban areas to absorb rural
surplus population.

20

From the lessons we reviewed above, a two-stage exit strategy can be designed to make
the transition from current land tenure system to a market-oriented land tenure system as
smooth as possible with minimum shock. First, exit rights should be given to peasants
who choose to leave the collective land ownership by entitling them the full ownership of
the plots that have been under their use since 1980s or since the most recent land
adjustment or land reallocation. The peasants can choose to stay, but they have the full
right to leave the current collective land ownership. Second, exit rights should be given to
those peasants who want to further exit from the farming sector. If they choose to do so,
they can sell either to other farmers for farming purpose, or to urban developers directly
as long as zoning and urban planning permits.
This will allow a plural land ownership and a true competitive land market to emerge
where the state-owned land, collectively owned land, and privately owned land will be
competing equally at the same land market. The government monopsony and monopoly
in land demand and supply, and the discrimination against the non-state owned land and
non-urban land will be brought down. A unified nationwide land market will finally
emerge to provide more reliable land price and housing price, which in turn provide the
sound basis for land allocation across the nation, especially for sustainable and
endogenous urbanization.
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